

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: CIA Comments on Joint Staff Paper entitled
"Sino-Soviet Bloc: Over-all Intelligence
Estimate for Planning, Mid-1959 Through
Mid-1967, Volume I, Part I: The Estimate"

a. Paragraph 6, last clause of last sentence, and Paragraph 7. It is clear, as stated in paragraphs 121-122 of NIE 11-4-59 that the ability of Communist China and the USSR to conduct identical coordinated policies has been declining. Accordingly, we feel that the referenced JCS text is a bit over-simplified and would suggest deletion of the last clause in paragraph 6 and the substitution of a new paragraph 7 as follows:

"7. The relative solidarity of the Bloc under Soviet influence and control enhances the unity and continuity of its activities, and gives it a certain advantage over the West, whose multiplicity of national policies requires greater negotiated adjustment and compromise. More central control permits greater tactical flexibility and rapid adjustment of Bloc actions to the needs of the moment in any particular field, with less prejudice to long-term policies or strategy. However, the status of Communist China with respect to Soviet influence and control gives it a greater voice in Bloc policy and greater freedom from Soviet control than that accorded other Bloc nations. This will probably constitute an increasingly difficult problem for the unity and continuity of Bloc policies."

b. Paragraph 23, last sentence. The statement that the USSR is striving to attain military superiority over the West which would assure it a clear-cut victory in nuclear war is not consistent with NIE 11-8-59 or NIE 11-4-59.

c. Paragraph 24. The meaning of this paragraph is ambiguous and its meaning might be more clear and consistent with National Estimates if the last sentence read as follows:

"Therefore, unless the USSR achieves a technological breakthrough which would permit it to attack the US at no great risk of heavy damage to itself, it will attempt in the years ahead to achieve capabilities which offer the highest degree of deterrence against US attack or at least assure survival in the event of war with the US."

d. Paragraphs 31 e, f, and g. The use of the words "destroy" and "force" tend to suggest military courses of action not consistent with NIE 11-4-59.

e. Paragraph 52. This is a more clear cut denial of the chances of Chinese Communist military action than is contained in NIE 13-59, paragraph 102.